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THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

By Kuban Mambetaliyev, Political scientist, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

Whenever inter-ethnic relations grow tense, the media comes under fire as the principal source of escalation of the conflicts, consciously or unconsciously serving the interests of the extremist groups. True, journalists are invariably in the forefront of social -political life, but their role cannot be categorically generalized - the media can act as a source of de-escalation neutralizing the extremist efforts.

The southern part of Kyrgyzstan is known to be a potential conflict zone and hence, attracts a close attention of the local, regional and foreign political analysts and experts. The region comprising of the Osh, Jalal-Abad and Batken provinces, is populated by more than half of the country’s citizens, including the ethnic Uzbek Diaspora which makes 14% of the total population of the country. Over the past decade, all the interethnic and border clashes took place in this region and became known to the whole world owing to their coverage by the journalists from Tashkent, Bishkek and Dushanbe. There is no sense in their analysis today, as any post-conflict fact-finding logically escalates the post-conflict situation, as it happened in some neighboring countries.

Let us consider certain events of the past two years which can illustrate the role of the mass media in preventing or escalating interethnic conflicts, and conflicts between the states.

Before flying to Astana for a summit of  leaders of Central Asian states in March 1999, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov publicly stated that “…every day five thousand Kyrgyz buy two loafs of bread each from Uzbekistan, and that’s what causes bread shortages, …whereas President of Kyrgyzstan Akayev inadequately controls the situation, and the only thing he can do well is to smile.” These remarks were repeatedly broadcast by the Uzbek state TV channels in Tashkent, Andijan, Ferghana, Kokand and other cities for several days, and were watched by the viewers in the south of Kyrgyzstan. Remarks of the Uzbek President confused not only the ethnic Kyrgyz, but also the Uzbek Diaspora, whose representatives sent a polite and delicately written letter to Karimov, pointing out the distortion of facts and the inadmissibility of interfering into the internal affairs of the neighboring country. Osh-based Uzbek-language newspaper “Osh Sodosi” made ironic comments on the statement of Karimov, and local Uzbek journalists filmed the Osh bazaar, where an Uzbek trader plainly said, that he sells fruits and vegetables, and buys flour and meat in Osh. He also stated that the Kyrgyz currency-som-is more stable than the Uzbek currency, sum. The Kyrgyz journalists, both from the state or independent media, did not react to the remarks of Islam Karimov. Nor did the President of Kyrgyzstan, who was used to similar accusations of the Uzbek president.  

In this situation, the Kyrgyz media played a positive role by responding promptly and objectively, and by showing a reasonable restraint. It was clear that President Karimov was misinformed by the head of the Andijan provincial administration, and was very nervous following a series of terrorist bombings in Tashkent. The real reason behind the statement became clear afterwards, when the “bread problem” was raised as a pretext for tightening the border controls.

Uzbekistan unilaterally introduced passport controls, and as a result, Uzbek border guards checked the passports of Kyrgyz citizens passing through the Uzbek checkpoints every day, on their way from one Kyrgyz provincial capital to another. The highway connecting Osh to Jalal-Abad through an Uzbek checkpoint is 50 km long, a detour through dirt-roads allowing to avoid this very checkpoint is 120 km long.

The escalation of confrontation comes from the depths of government structures, while the local population on either side of the border finds itself drawn into these inter-state disputes and top-level political games against its own will. This real threat amplifies the role of the media in intercepting the ambitions of the rulers, initiating a dialogue and searching for a common ground for the solution of the problems. So far, there is no apparent willingness to start that dialogue, whereas the barbed-wire barriers are already in place. There are inconveniences not only for the Kyrgyz, but also for the Uzbek, like in the village of Madaniyat of Jalal-Abad province. The village itself and the part of the highway which crosses it belongs to Uzbekistan, while the same highway before and after the village belongs to Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz governor has ordered checkpoints on the entry and exit from the village (of course.. only for the “security reasons” in the wake of the Batken events). And of course these checkpoints create serious problems for the residents of both countries.

Kyrgyz drivers by-pass the village through dirt roads without any obstacles even if it is 8 km longer than through the highway crossing the village. As for the drivers from Uzbekistan, they are also forced to use the same dirt road as the village is sealed off on both sides, while the highway inside the village has become a pedestrian alley. Uzbek drivers are forced to register at the Kyrgyz checkpoints twice, at both ends of the village.

The media display an outmost caution in their treatment of that potentially explosive topic, and focus only on the most obvious cases which simply cannot be ignored.

In early May 2000, the Bishkek newspapers carried reports about an explosion of a landmine, which was installed at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border near the village of Boz-Adyr of the Kadamzhai district of Batken province. In that disputed area, which had not been demarcated yet, the Uzbekistani border-guards had planted a whole minefield, which had already killed several domestic animals of local residents. This time the explosion claimed lives of three Uzbek border-guards, who were not aware of the minefield as the warning flags had been removed. This tragic accident requires a more principled approach to ensure the security of the civilians in both countries. Avoiding to “offend the neighbor” by discussing sore subjects is fraught with far-reaching consequences. The reaction could be completely different if the next victims of Uzbek mines will be the Kyrgyz soldiers. Only the media tries to highlight this problem.

In 1995, the Governor of Osh province Janysh Rustenbekov was fired from his office after giving an interview to an independent Bishkek daily Kyrgyz Rukhu, where he outlined radical measures for settling the border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. His proposals sparked serious concerns in official Tashkent which always  prefers to see the southern provinces of Kyrgyzstan ruled by governors loyal to the will of Uzbekistani leaders. President Akayev is known to have always complied with Tashkent’s requests of this kind. The new Governor, Temirbek Akmataliyev, makes public statements about the inadmissibility to escalate border disputes for “…a handful of land plots measuring several hundred square meters.” He also blames irresponsible journalists and the opposition politicians in escalation of the dispute. 

In fact, the dispute concerns hundreds of hectares of Kyrgyzstan’s land which back in the Soviet times were leased to Uzbekistani cotton farmers in the interests of “solving the economic problems of national importance”. Several dozen parcels of Kyrgyz land of 100 hectares each, are used by Uzbekistan. The Soviet Union is no more there, the lease terms have long expired, the resolutions of the Council of Ministers of USSR were recognized as null and void and no one is willing to apply solutions which already have an international precedent. Karimov does not seem to want to negotiate, Akayev does not dare to demand, the disputed lands are fenced and become gunpowder kegs, and the source of evil are journalists who write about border clashes, customs abuses, and two different maps of border demarcation:  Tashkent recognizes the map drawn in 1924-1927, while Bishkek is content with the map drawn in 1955.

The mass media of Kyrgyzstan doesn’t confine itself to the exposure of negative facts alone and objectively covers the positive trends in foreign politics.  Although no border agreement has been reached so far, there are signs of intensified rapprochement with Uzbekistan in other spheres. On May 5, 2000, Bishkek played a host to the second session of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek intergovernmental commission for commerce and economic relations, where the parties agreed to reduce excise duties, simplified visa procedures, coordinate the use of radio frequencies, jointly use the water resources and construct the Sokh water-reservoir.

The media does not emphasize the factor of the historic past which became a powerful instigator of confrontation in Karabakh. There is no source of inevitable ethnic conflict in the south of Kyrgyzstan today. Yet, there are subjective tendencies that may provoke such conflicts. Models of ethnic strife are short lived in Osh and mainly appear spontaneously. A symptomatic event happened in February 2000, during the  parliamentary elections. OSH-TV, a channel oriented at the Uzbek Diaspora, aired an Uzbek-language ad in support of Davran Sabirov, one of the most influential leaders of the Uzbek Diaspora who has been thrice elected a deputy from the city of Osh. 

The ad featured a scene, where  a group of rich horsemen rob a poor man and was accompanied by a phrase: “This is what you’ll get if you don’t vote for Davran Sabirov.” This short clip had long repercussions of ethnic nature. The scene in the ad was based on a play called “Landlord and the Serf, ”  written by the Uzbek classic author Khamza. The horsemen in the clip were dressed in Kyrgyz costumes (horsemen in our countries are traditionally associated with nomads, while people without a horse are linked to settled agriculturists), while the poor man was dressed in Uzbek clothing.

As a result, the home-brewed production of the local scriptwriters sparked the indignation of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz viewers alike. The clip was taken off the air, the regional electoral commission decided to ban Davran Sabirov from the race, even if he had practically won the lection. The situation was exasperated by the fact, that his contender was an ethnic Kyrgyz, and naturally, the Uzbek electorate took this as a purposeful action against their candidate. In this situation, where the TV became the main wrong-doer,  the Central electoral commission displayed a good will, overturned the ruling of the regional commission and  the ethnic Uzbek deputy received his well earned mandate. In case of a different ruling, the consequences could have been more dramatic.

The Osh-TV, which broadcast the ill-fated commercial, is one of the most popular independent TV companies of Kyrgyzstan. It was founded back in 1991 as the first private TV company in Central Asia. The off-record arguments of the bureaucrats about the Osh-TV as a servant of Uzbekistan’s global strategic interests are not valid. It was precisely this channel, which displayed professionalism, promptness and balanced interethnic stance while expressing Kyrgyzstan’s national interests and safeguarding primarily Kyrgyzstanis’ dignity during the most critical moments of information wars. It was Osh-TV reporters who criticized.Karimov’s March statement, filmed excellent blitz-interviews in the market and near the customs office, and exposed the nearsighted border policies pursued by Uzbekistan. The audience was free to see mere facts and understand the roots of incidents, without any pressure or dictated sense of direction. The same professionalism was displayed during the Batken war, when Osh TV’s reporter  Zulfiya Kozhayeva made a report from the Kyrgyz village of Kara-Teyit bombarded by the confused Uzbek jets in the fall of 1999.

Worse than that, both sides afterwards were trying to cover up this fact. Newsmen were strictly forbidden to visit the ill-fated village (the home village of Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary speaker Abdygany Erkebayev) but a fragile girl, reporter from Osh, outstripped bulky generals by fulfilling her professional duty. The videocassette broke all barriers and was shown worldwide. The media was courageously exposing other ugly aspects of the war by adding fresh facts to the strictly dosed information provided by the government sources. For example, after the first group of hostages was seized (later released for a ransom of US $50,000) official statements would conceal the position occupied by one of the captive officers describing him as a staff officer of Kyrgyzstan’s military intelligence. But it appeared that he was not an ordinary officer, but the head of the Military Intelligence himslef.

Today we witness a drive towards the consolidation of the media throughout the Central Asian region. There are positive examples of cooperation, like the launch of  a regional TV program entitled “Open Asia” on April 11, 1999. The program is a result of joint effort of Internews offices in Bishkek, Tashkent, Almaty and Dushanbe. Thematically related footages, taken in each of the Central Asian republics, are composed into a single 26-minute program and broadcast in each of the four republics by independent TV channels. The viewers in Tashkent and Dushanbe cannot watch this broadcasts because there are no independent channels there, but the program can be viewed in other cities of Uzbekistan - Angren, Andijan, Margelan, Urgench, Jizak, as well as in Tajikistan’s Kanibadam, Vos, Khojent, Isfara. As for Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan, there are no limitations of any kind. A total of 20 programs have already been aired. Nobody objects to the language of the program-Russian. Everybody agrees that the Russian  language helps a lot to bring the Central Asian republics together.

The programs’ main characters are ordinary citizens whose destinies provoke lively response throughout the region. On April 18, 2000 the Editorial board of Open Asia also showed a program about border disputes.

The media sees its duty in helping their fellow countrymen to get rid of fear, mutual mistrust and prejudices. While Open Asia’s programs criticizing Presidents Akayev or Nazarbayev are perceived by the audience in Bishkek and Almaty as something ordinary, the same criticism in Dushanbe and Tashkent has quite a different effect on the broad public mentality, manifesting examples of freedom of speech and thought. The citizens of Central Asia are involved in the general context of confrontation between internal and external forces, the outcome of which depends on concerted efforts aimed at creating and strengthening the civil society institutions and independent media-its leading component.It is vital today to be able to resist attempts of promoting an image of an authoritarian ruler under the pretext of the “specific Asian mentality”, which allegedly does not fit civilized standards.

That’s why our countries should spare no efforts in training bright young people, promoting joint projects and programs, encouraging brave journalistic investigations and staunchly defending freedom of speech and the press.