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Media and Conflicts in the Caucasus

Mark GRIGORYAN, Armenia

            Sometimes, it seems that pressing issues do not exist unless they are tackled.  But they nevertheless continue to exist, and driven underground, make an ugly comeback. Journalism is there to present those pressing issues. Dusan Reljic wrote: "The coverage of a conflict is not a special situation for a journalist and does not consider a special set of rules. On the contrary, the coverage of political, economic and other collisions in the society is pretty much a part of the journalistic routine. Conflicts are part of the ordinary in the democracy. Absence of conflicts suggests an absence of democracy".[i]

The role of the mass media in the conflicts still needs to be researched despite several recent books and articles, dedicated to the study of the effects of articles and TV programs on the popular mood, and their ability to provoke inter-ethnic and inter-confessional conflicts[ii].

Before analyzing the role of the media in the escalation and coverage of the conflicts in the Caucasus, we should distinguish between their role as carriers of information and carriers of propaganda. As carriers of information, the media inform consumers-readers and viewers-about a conflict. The more fully this role is accomplished, the more trusted the media are and the less role they play in escalating tension and emotions around an already tense situation.

            As carriers of propaganda, the  media are used by non-journalists, or rather are misused for non-journalistic purposes, i.e. for agitation, propaganda or channeling public opinion in the direction required by the owners of the media. In the case of the conflicts in the Caucasus which started  in 1988 (Karabakh, Ossetia, Abkhazia), the owner of the media was Soviet Union ruled by the CPSU.

It is important to remember, that escalation of conflicts in the Caucasus coincided with the collapse of  the USSR, which was bound to be accompanied by a new national self-identification[iii]. This implies a quest for a place in history and contemporary world, a desire to link the present and the past into a one continuum (which is sometimes senseless, as the past and the present are simply merged into one).  Such attempts were accompanied by calls to "return to national roots" and "restore national traditions". Nationalist trends in the society were bound to be somehow reflected in the mass media, and not only reflected but also disseminated by the media. This is an example of the use of papers and the TV for non-journalistic purposes, and this was irritating. It is interesting that, according to many accounts,  radio was not an irritating factor in the Caucasus.       

In his work entitled "The Mass Media and Inter-State Conflicts in Georgia", Georgi Topuria showed that in the context of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the Georgian public was most of all irritated by the appeal of the Abkhaz intelligentsia to the Supreme Council of the USSR, requesting the cessation of Abkhazia from Georgia. In the case of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, the point of no-return was reached after the publication of the letter of the ethnic Ossetian scientist Alan Chochiev supporting the Abkhaz intelligentsia 4. Parallel to the escalation of these conflicts, the Literaturuli Sakartvelo newspaper (The Literary Georgia), was regularly publishing "explanatory" articles on the origins of the Abkhaz and Ossetian peoples and their settlement in Georgia5.

            It is clear that in all these cases the media were not used to inform about events, but  to agitate for certain ideas, and hence were used for non-journalistic purposes. As for the Karabakh conflict, the role of the media still needs to be explored. But it goes without saying, that at the beginning of the conflict, readers and viewers on both sides were expecting the media to tell "their" truth and support their view on the events. Instead, the media was full of speeches, appeals, declarations and statements initiated mainly by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Inadequacy of these actions was causing sharp reaction.6

It is important to note, that consumers (mainly opposition-oriented intellectuals) demanded and got an inadequate coverage of the conflict, but it was based on the views of the Communist authorities, the CPSU, and could not satisfy these very consumers. Thus, at the first stage of the conflict, the informative function of the media remained unclaimed by both, the consumers and owners.

The same can be said about the press in Samtskhe-Javakheti, an Armenian populated region in Georgia. Most of the articles about the region are more propagandistic than informative, and hence, negatively influence the situation in the region and relationships between Armenia and Georgia.

In 1996, one of the Yerevan courts suspended the publication of the Armenian newspaper Molorak for three months, for publishing a couple of articles about the Armenian-Georgian relations. Similar articles were published in the Georgian press, and among them the article in Rezonansi called "Perfect Preconditions For Turning Javakheti into Karabakh"  which caused a big uproar.

It is enough to read the headlines in the “Samtskhe-Javakheti”, organ of the local provincial administration, to see how the Armenian population of the region is being brainwashed (the newspaper is published both in Armenian and Georgian):

"Who Profits From the Publications in the "Independent Press", "On Some Urgent Measures to Improve the Socio-Economic Situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti Province",

"Javakheti between the Real and Imaginary Problems", "No Serious Problems-Only Issues to Resolve."  The absence of coverage of the conflict, and replacing the work of journalists with a brainwash promoted the conflicts in the Caucasus. Especially irritating are the articles about the “indigenous territories.” Whoever writes them, tries to prove that his ethnic kin have historic rights to that particular land and the rest are newcomers and guests. This theme is connected to “restoring the historic justice” and is one of the major conflictogenic factors in the Caucasus 7.

            Strictly speaking, discussing history in the mainstream press cannot be considered as scientifically correct. It should be carried on in specialized press. The public on the both sides of the conflict is interested to be informed about the opposite side. In 1996, two years after the cease-fire, Armenian readers were interested in Azerbaijan and Armenian papers kept informing them about the events in the neighboring country. 8  One could expect that the information they received was presented based on the principle  'the worse the better', but in reality everything was more complicated.

            A small research made in spring 1999 and presented at the 8^th Journalist Conference within the Caucasus Media Support Project, showed the real role of the theme of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and Azerbaijan in the Armenian press.9

The subject of the research were news articles -1500 of them.  The research revealed, that news about Azerbaijan and the related conflict occupy the forth place, after political, economic and criminal news.

            Materials related to the conflict were divided as follows: all standard reports about border incidents were placed in the official Hayastani Hanrapetutyun and made up 17% of all the news reports. 38% of materials were of a positive character and tell about the need in the peace process, the mediation of the Minsk group of OSCE.

26% of articles had a negative, militant tonality. Hence, from the point of view of the informative function of the press, in spring 1999 the Armenian press was dominated by a positive mood. Out of all reports about Azerbaijan, about 60% referred to military issues and about 30% to oil. Looking through the same reports from another perspective reveals, that in 53% of cases, Azerbaijan was associated with the United States and NATO. Hence the biggest concern for Armenia are the military matters and possible cooperation of Azerbaijan with the US and NATO. Oil is less interesting,  and relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey almost pass unnoticed. And, once again, all this is in the context of positive attitude towards the conflict resolution.

This means that the media are more positive in their informative function, and more negative in their propagandistic function. This situation does not concern the active stage of the conflict, when any information from the front line - about victories or defeats - carries a negative message.

And finally, lets consider the negative role of the media in escalating conflicts by creating pseudo-events, i.e. a small scale, insignificant events whipped up by the press and turned into an event of a much larger scale. For example the unexpected “Internet War”- an attack by an Azerbaijani hacker from Baku on Armenian sites. This event caused an extremely emotional response in the Azerbaijani press, which was commenting on the hacking as a heroic act proving the intellectual superiority of Azerbaijanis over the Armenians. For some time, the hacker became a hero of articles and interviews. The excessive noise forced some Armenian hackers, whose moral perceptions were not much different from those of their Azerbaijani colleague, to take counter-measures blocking several Internet providers in Azerbaijan for several days. After the  interference of “competent bodies, ” the Internet war was stopped, and the virtual mutual extermination averted. 

            However, no confrontation is caused by highly professional coverage of conflicts, when reporters show but do not hide, report but do not moralize, inform but do not propagandize, in one word, remain professional. And such examples also exist.