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Afghanistan and Central Asia Alexander KHAMAGAEV,International Journalist Training Center,Uzbekistan The
appearance of newly independent states in Central Asia crucially changed the
power balance within Afghanistan. If earlier Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, and other
resident peoples of Afghanistan were considered as minorities with rather
unclear ethnic identity, now that independent state formations of Uzbeks, Tajiks,
Turkmens and other peoples of Central Asia appeared, national self-consciousness
of Afghanistani minorities took a new dimension. This factor, along with internal wars and complete central authority break-up in the country, promoted appearance of ideas of distinguishing ethnic minorities from the concept of 'united Afghan nation' and their integrating them into new state formations on the North of the Afghanistan border. One of such ideas is forming Great Tajikistan, which is popular among Afghan Tajiks leaders and counterbalancing with the idea of united Pushtunistan. If the Afghan crisis is solved only in accordance with Pushtuni majority interests, neglected assertions of the Tajik population will cause rise of Tajik nationalism, which, having flopped over to neighboring Tajikistan, could start. Sucj a formation, may be unwittingly, could disrupt national unity in Uzbekistan. To prevent this threat was one of the aims of efforts attempting formation of multiethnic government in Afghanistan. Other
negative consequences of the Afghan crisis for Central Asia states may be the
threat of spreading religious ideology, turning the Central Asia states to drug
traffic passage-way from Afghanistan, danger of terrorism outspread associated
with the Wahabi groups' activities,
and possible refugee outflow from Afghanistan. According
to some observers' view, the Taliban regime is increasingly intent on
manipulating conflicts both in Central and Southern Asia. Thus, one of the
regional analysts Ahmad Rashid supports this argument with the fact of training
camps provided by Talibs on their territory to the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan and the Kashmir radical movement Harakat Ul-Mojaheddin. All said
above draws up the environment in which Central Asia states found themselves
upon the USSR dissolution, and reflects qualitative changes in the inter-Afghan
conflict. The Afghan conflict is forcing the states of Central Asia to develop and
diversify their relations and orientation in the sphere security with other
countries and not only with Russia, their traditional guarantor of security.
Traditional vision of security concern between Russia and the countries of
Central Asia is getting unclear indeed. On the one hand, Russia is considered a
regional security guarantor by way of her national interests, and as a potential
power limiting the Central Asia states' independence and sovereignty on the
other hand. Unlike
Russia, the states of the region are not worried with NATO expansion to the East
and show their openness to active cooperation within the NATO program 'Partnership
for Peace'.
The
only thing that clearly shows unity of the Russia and Central Asia states in the
matter of security is their pursuit to prevent the thread of terrorism and
fundamentalism outspread from Afghanistan. Now
it is obvious that the CIS countries' different vision of their national concern
in security, different perception of regional security problems and external
threat served as one of the reasons of the Collective Security Agreement (1992)
inaction. Speaking only of Central Asia, there is no clear unity here in the
regional security issues. Tajikistan considers the Russian troops presence as
its security guarantee. At the same time, Uzbekistan is against Russian military
presence being expanded in the region. When the Central Asia states stood in
united front against the Talibs' regime reinforcement in Afghanistan,
Turkmenistan, following the principle of 'positive neutrality', set good
neighborhood relations with Talibs, by that protecting Turkmen people in
Afghanistan from possible persecution, and even started to trash out the
possibility to transport Turkmen hydrocarbon raw to the Southern ports through
Afghanistan. However, since 1997, the Central Asia states' attitude towards
Talibs somewhat softened, though they are still not satisfied with the Talibs'
sole government. The
difference between the CIS states' approaches to the security issues,
particularly among the Central Asia states, contribute to larger involvement of
military and other structures of the US and their partners in resolution of the
regional security problems. And according to the Indian Institute of Development
Study and Analysis (IDSA), countries of Central Asia, keeping in memory
conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, realizing that each one of them has its
own potential Kosovo and knowing of bombardment of Yugoslavia, are being put
into a dilemma: on the one hand, they reject the NATO military solution of any
ethnic problem as an option, on the other hand they are not sure whom they might
rely on if such problems arise in Central Asia. None of regional structures
could act as a one reliable security system. Who could help in its formation?
Moscow is busy with the Chechnya problem and prefers building relationship with
countries of the region on bilateral basis, without interfering into internal
conflicts of these states. As
for the US, first of all, they have their own concern in any region of the world.
It appears, at least, from straightforward words of the former US special
missionary to Afghan resistance Peter Tomsen who was in the rank of Ambassador
there from 1989 to 1992. He believes real progress in resolving the Afghan
crisis may only be reached if the US strikes out a policy more coinciding with
the Washington’s interests in Afghanistan and surrounding region than it is
now. As the main threat to the American interests coming from Afghanistan he
sees the flow of Islamic fighters and international terrorists with their net
over nearly the whole world as the primary concern. This
fear is sure to coincide with anxiety of Russia and countries of Central Asia.
However, Tomsen thinks growth of Islamic radicalism dominance in the Central
Asia countries might force their governments to seek for Russia's military
support, and this is, of course, undesirable for the US. According to what he
says, Tajikistan has nearly turned to a Russian protectorate.
As
we can see, even such a generally recognized threat coming out from the
Afghanistan area as Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism is being considered by
the American analyst from the point of view of the American security interests. Thus,
before choosing one or another force, countries of the Central Asian region
should weigh all pros and cons, taking into account that nearest security
profile for each one of them will be in many aspects determined by developments
in Afghanistan where a new turn in opposition between Talibs and the Northern
Alliance is coming up. Materials used: ·
Ahmad Rashid. Taliban aided terrorism and
regional instability. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. January 19, 2000 ·
The
Afghan Conflict and Regional Security/ A monthly journal of the IDSA. August
1999. Vol. XXIII 5 pp 719-747 ·
Peter Tomsen. A Chance for Peace in
Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs. January – February 2000, Vol.79, Number 1
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